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Multiple Legal Representation of ERISA
Plans and Employers Following Allegations
of Fraud and Malfeasance
ELWYN C. LEE*

A private pension plan is one established by an employer, a group of
employers, or a group of employees, rather than by a local, state, or federal
government.1 In 1940 an estimated four million employees were covered
by private pension plans; by the early 1970's this number had grown to
more than thirty million employees.2 These private pension plans were
expected to cover approximately forty-two million employees by 19801
with plan assets valued at between $225 and $250 billion.4 In an attempt
to regulate this rapid accumulation of funds, Congress enacted the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)5 ERISA
substantially supersedes prior legislation and generally preempts state
law6 in the area. It contains comprehensive provisions dealing with
*B.A. 1972, Yale University; J.D. 1975, Yale Law School. Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center. While this article was going to press, the American Bar Association House of Delegates began voting on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Final
Draft 1981). See N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1983, at 1, col. 2; see also notes 130-36 & accompanying
text infra.
' Note, Attorney's Liabilities Under ERISA, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 129 n.1 (1979). See
D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS, 14-28 (3d ed. 1975). A private plan can
be contrasted with a "governmental plan" defined as "a plan established or maintained
for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the government of any State
or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing." Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. S 1002(32) (1976).
2 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4639, 4641. Forces encouraging the growth of private pension plans include
employer desire to increase the productivity of employees, tax inducements offered by
the federal government, and pressure from organized labor. D. MCGILL, supra note 1, at
21-28.
3 S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 11 (1973), reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4890, 4899; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1973), reprintedin [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4839-40.
1 S. REP. No. 383, supra note 3, at 13, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4900 ($225 billion estimate); S. REP. No. 127, supra note 3, at 3, reprintedin [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4840 (projected 1980 amount to exceed $250 billion). According
to a study released by the Department of Labor by the year 1995 private pension plan
assets will increase to $2.9 trillion. Labor Department Issues Study ForecastingChange in
Source of Plan Assets, PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 292, at A-23 (May 5, 1980).
1 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 8, 26, 29, 31 &
42 U.S.C.).
' Section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), provides that, except for causes
of action arising prior to January 1, 1975, the ERISA provisions "supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."
ERISA section 514(cXl), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1976), provides that "[t]he term 'State law'
includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of
law, of any State." State insurance, banking, or securities regulations are not invalidated,
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funding,' vesting requirements,8 prudent investment standards,9 and
especially strict guidelines for the adoption and administration"0 of a
private pension plan.
The purpose of ERISA was to remedy prior ineffective pension fund
acts." In 1958, after a comprehensive investigation of abuses in the administration and investment of private fund assets, 2 Congress enacted the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 19581 to protect plan participants from unauthorized use of pension funds. The 1958 Act created
plan administrators who were required to make certain disclosures.' The
Act was amended in 1962 to make theft, embezzlement, and bribery or
kickbacks involving pension funds and pension officials federal crimes. 5
Even with this amendment the 1958 Act proved to be unenforceable and
consequently ineffective. 6
Events in the decade following passage of the 1962 amendment
demonstrated the inadequacy of the 1958 Act;"7 it failed to regulate the
private pension system and therefore offered little protection to the rights
and benefits due to millions of American workers. 8 It became evident
to Congress that the 1958 Act's disclosure requirements were too limited
and that the Act lacked substantive fiduciary standards. 9 The chief procedural weakness of the Act was its reliance upon the initiative of individual employees of the business to police the management of the plan.'
however. ERISA § 514(b}(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. S 1144(b)(2)(A) (1976). Several federal courts have
held that ERISA was intended by Congress to preempt the entire field of employee benefit
plan regulation. Lederman v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (C.D. Cal.
1980); Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affid mem., 553 F.2d 93
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
7 ERISA SS 301-306, 29 U.S.C. SS1081-1086 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
8 ERISA S 203, 29 U.S.C. S 1053 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
9 ERISA 5 404, 29 U.S.C. S 1104 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
,0ERISA SS 101-111, 29 U.S.C. S§1021-1031 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
" See H.R. REP.No. 533, supra note 2, at 3-5, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4641-43; S.REP. No. 127, supra note 3,at 2-7, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 4839-44.
" Ford, The Aftermath of Daniel: Private Pension Plans, ERISA and the Federal Antifraud Provisions, 46 Mo. L. REv. 51, 54 (1981).
Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed by ERISA).
Id. at S 5, 72 Stat. at 999 (repealed by ERISA).
Stat. 35, 41 (repealed by ERISA).
15Act of March 20, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-420, § 17, 7.6
16 See generally sources cited note 2 supra.
1

See note 18 infra.

a senate hearing on pension plan legislation Senator Dent noted that "in an investigation of a certain union management fund we found that the number of persons in
the lifetime of that fund that had received any benefits at all were less than one out of
10 covered by the fund over a period of 40 years." Private Welfare andPension PlanLegislation: Hearings on H.R. 1045, H.R. 1046, and H.R. 16462 Before the Subcommittee on Labor
of the Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 262 (1970) (remarks
of Sen. Dent). Instances of lost pension benefits due to inadequate disclosure are detailed
in R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, You AND YOUR PENSION 4-11 (1973). See also sources cited
note 11 supra.
19See sources cited note 11 supra.
'0See sources cited note 11 supra.
18 In
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Resulting ineffectiveness caused private pension funds to be terminated,
and caused participating employees to be denied benefits upon which they
and their families had been relying for retirement.2' Congress passed
ERISA in order to respond to a public outcry for governmental intervention' and to establish minimum standards designed to assure equitable
character and financial soundness of the employee benefit plans.2
Although much discussion has focused on the undesirability of
premature or unwarranted termination of pension plans and imprudent
investment of funds, the central concern of ERISA is the plan's participants' ability to realize the total benefits due them. It is important
to apply this central concern while analyzing the consequences of a
fiduciary's actions because the effectiveness of ERISA depends in large
measure on intense scrutiny of fiduciary duty.24
This article will address the question of whether a court is required
to disqualify attorneys who simultaneously represent a private employee
pension plan governed by ERISA and the employer in a lawsuit brought
by a plan participant or beneficiary who has alleged fraud and malfeasance
on the part of the plan administrators and the employer. Concomitantly,
the article will question whether the plan administrators are obligated
under ERISA to seek independent outside counsel in this situation.
The problem can be illustrated by the following hypothetical drawn
from the structure used by a large American corporation. Assume that
a major corporation, identified as M-corp, has a division named M-div.
" See sources cited note 11 supra.
See sources cited note 11 supra. In enacting ERISA, Congress took note of this outcry
in its congressional findings and declaration of policy:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee
benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the continued well being and security of millions of employees and their dependents
are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a national
public interest; ... that owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the interests
of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare
and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be
provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of
such plans; ... that despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees
with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with
respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that
owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated,
employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits.
ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976).
2 ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976).
24 H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 2, at 11, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4649. ("[T]he safeguarding effect of the fiduciary responsibility section will operate efficiently only if fiduciaries are aware that the details of their dhalings will be open to inspection, and that individual participants and beneficiaries will be armed with enough information to enforce their own rights as well as the obligations owed by the fiduciary to the
plan in general.").
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Pursuant to ERISA, M-div adopts an employee pension benefit plan with
more than 100 participants. Although M-div is the sponsor of the benefit
plan, M-corp is the ultimate employer of the plan participants. M-corp's
counsel advise M-div on establishing the plan and creating a structure
for administering the benefits and complying with ERISA. M-corp's attorneys continue to provide legal advice to M-div pertaining to the administration of the plan, its day-to-day implementation, and the application of the plan provisions to particular facts. Files of the plan are kept
in M-corp offices by M-corp employees. However, the terms of the plan
reserve the power to amend the plan to M-div and give the authority
to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan to
three named fiduciaries, who, for purposes of this article, may be identified as A, B, and C. All three are employees of M-corp and plan
administrators.
A participant in the benefit plan, identified as P, sues the benefit plan"
and M-corp in federal court. The suit is based on allegations that certain
aspects of the M-div benefit plan administration do not comply with
ERISA, and that fraud and malfeasance by the plan administrators and
by M-corp have permitted M-corp to retain money that belongs to P and
other participants of the benefit plan. 28 P seeks damages, injunctive relief,
' Section 502(d)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1132(d)(1) (1976), provides that "[a]n employee
benefit plan may sue or be sued under this title as an entity .... " One goal of section
502(d)(1) is to ensure that a plan participant with a grievance has a civil remedy:
The enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to provide both
the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for
redressing or preventing violations of [ERISA as well as the amendments made
to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act]. The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal and equitable remedies available in
both state and federal courts and to remove jurisdictional and procedural
obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective enforcement
of fiduciary responsibilities under state law for recovery of benefits due to
participants.
H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 2, at 17, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4655. In Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Star Co., 543
F. Supp. 906 (D.D.C. 1982), the court noted that ERISA established, "in clear and unmistakable
terms, that a pension fund is an independent entity, separate from the employer." Id. at
910. The court declared that "despite an employer's close involvement with and funding
of the Plan, it [the plan] nevertheless exists as a fully separate legal entity." Id.
For example, section 203(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1053(b}(2)(A) (1976), defines
the term "year of service" as "a calendar year, plan year, or other 12-consecutive month
period designated by the plan (and not prohibited under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary) during which the participant has completed 1,000 hours of service." The plan
administrators may apply a rule for computing a year of service for vesting purposes that
is different from the 1,000 hour rule. The application of a different vesting rule could have
two effects: first, such application could be fraudulent if documents filed with the government by the plan called for the 1,000 hour rule, and second, such application could result
in the employer's retaining employer contributions to pension plan accounts after the plan
administrators find such contributions nonvested. As another example, there could be a
group life insurance policy whose premiums are paid only by plan participants. If the policy
provides for refunds of surplus premium payments in the form of dividends to plan participants, the failure to disclose the existence of the refunds as required by the Depart-

1982]

REPRESENTATION OF ERISA PLANS

and an accounting. If P prevails on the merits of his suit, M-corp will
be required to repay millions of dollars27 in withheld funds to plan participants and beneficiaries. M-corp's counsel have elected to defend the
plan with the aid of a large outside law firm that has represented M-corp
on a retainer basis for years. The named fiduciaries A, B, and C have
consented to have the plan represented by the same law firm representing M-corp. M-corp's inside and outside counsel have informed A, B, and
C that these counsel can exercise independent professional judgment in
deciding what is necessary for the plan and A, B, and C have accepted
said counsel. P objects to the absence of independentoutside counsel defending the plan and moves to have the law firm and M-corp's inside counsel
disqualified from their simultaneous representation of M-div's plan and
M-corp.
The chief sources of possible constraints on such multiple representation are the fiduciary duties under ERISA and the codes of professional
conduct for attorneys. Following a discussion of the structure of the pertinent part of ERISA, this article presents an analysis of the effect of
these sources of constraints and concludes that when fraud and breach
of fiduciary duty are so alleged, counsel should be disqualified under
ERISA from representing the plan and the sponsoring corporation.
THE PERTINENT STRUCTURE OF

ERISA

In section 3 of ERISA, Congress defined an employee benefit plan as
"an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan
or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee
pension benefit plan."28 Simply stated, an employee pension benefit plan
ment of Labor ERISA regulations, 29 C.F.R. 5 2520.104-20(b)(3), 21(b)(2) (1981); see also
1979 EMPL. BEN. COMP. COORDINATOR (Research Inst. of Am.) 19,405 (May 1, 1979), and
the retention of the refunds by the employer could form the foundation for claims of fraud
and fiduciary malfeasance against the plan administrators and fraudulent conversion against
the employer.
" The damages recoverable for violation of the fiduciary duties are measured by the
losses sustained by the pension plan or the profits realized by the fiduciary. See ERISA
409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1976).
ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1976). Section 3(1 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1002(1)
(1976), defines an employee welfare benefit plan as
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established
or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both,
to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries,
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death
or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or
(B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions
on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. S 1002(2) (Supp. IV 1980), defines an employee pension benefit plan as
any plan, fund or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established
or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both,
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under ERISA is a plan established and maintained pursuant to a written
agreement that provides for benefits and establishes a mechanism for
administering such benefits. The intent of such a broad definition was
to give the most complete protection to plan participants and beneficiaries
for whom such plans are established.' Every plan must provide a procedure for establishing and carrying out a funding policy, describe procedures under the plan for allocation of responsibilities for the operation
and administration of the plan, provide a procedure for amending the plan,
and specify the basis on which payments are made to and from the plan."
Each employee benefit plan has a plan sponsor that may be, and in
many cases is, the employer." In addition to a plan sponsor, an employee
benefit plan must have a "plan administrator," who has full responsibility
for operation of the plan, including meeting certain disclosure and reporting requirements.2 When a plan administrator is not designated by the
operative plan instrument, the plan sponsor is the plan administrator.'
Thus, inasmuch as the plan sponsor may be the employer, the plan administrator may be the employer or the employer's designated employee.
Each plan must have at least one named fiduciary who serves as plan
to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding cir-

cumstances such plan, fund, or program(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to
the termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan,
the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of
distributing benefits from the plan.
29 ERISA S 3(7), 29 U.S.C. S 1002(7) (1976), defines a participant as
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive
a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees
of such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may
be eligible to receive any such benefit.
ERISA S 3(8), 29 U.S.C. S 1002(8) (1976), defines beneficiary as "a person designated by
a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan who is or may become entitled
to a benefit thereunder."
10ERISA S 402(b), 29 U.S.C. S 1102(b) (1976).
"1 ERISA 5 402(a), 29 U.S.C. S 1102(a) (1976). See also Id. at S 3(16)(B), 29 U.S.C. at
S 1002(16)(B), which defines "plan sponsor" as
(i) the employer in the case of an employee benefit plan established or maintained by a single employer, (ii) the employee organization in the case of a
plan established or maintained by an employee organization, or (iii) in the case
of a plan established or maintained by two or more employers or jointly by
one or more employers and one or more employee organizations, the association, committee, joint board of trustees, or other similar group of representatives of the parties who establish or maintain the plan.
12 See ERISA S 3(16)(A), 29 U.S.C. S 1002(16)(A) (1976); Id. at SS 101-105, 29 U.S.C. at
SS 1021-1025 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
ERISA S 3(161(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. S 1002(16)(A}(ii), (1976). In the case of a plan for which
the administrator is not designated and a plan sponsor cannot be identified, such person
as the Secretary of Labor may by regulation prescribe the plan administrator. Id. at (iii),
29 U.S.C. at S 1002(16)(A) (iii).
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administrator, and, if plan assets are held in trust, the plan must have
at least one trustee.' The named fiduciary that normally appoints such
trustee is the plan administrator." A plan may have as few or as many
fiduciaries as are necessary for its operation and administration."'
Under ERISA's reporting provisions, plan administrators are required
to file the plan's annual report, copies of a summary plan description,
and other documents with the Secretary of Labor.' The summary plan
description must be accurate, easily comprehensible by the average plan
participant, and sufficiently complete to inform participants and their
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan. 8 The annual
report must contain a financial statement comprised of information on
the plan's expenses, its assets and liabilities, significant changes in the
plan's benefits, the number of persons covered, and transactions involving the plan. 9
The effect of ERISA's funding safeguards is to ensure the existence
of sufficient plan financing and reserves for the satisfaction of a plan's
pension liabilities to participants and their beneficiaries. This is accomplished by providing minimum standards for employer contributions to
defined benefit plans," an increase in the maximum federal income tax
deduction for employer contributions,4' more extensive governmental
supervision of private pension plans,42 and the imposition of civil sanctions3
in addition to the loss of tax advantages for violation of the funding
provisions." Fiduciaries administering the funds must also diversify plan
I ERISA 5 402(aXl), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1976); Id. at S 403(a), 29 U.S.C. at S 1103(a)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also Id. at 5 408(b2), 29 U.S.C. at S 1108(b)(2) (1976); Id. at
§ 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. at § 1108(c)(3) (1976), discussed respectively at notes 76 & 78 infra.
" See ERISA 5 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
" Question FR-12, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1981).
3, ERISA § 101-105, 29 U.S.C. § 1021-1025 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). ERISA's remedy
provisions are available to provide recovery for losses sustained because of false or misleading
information in its required documents. See Id. at § 502, 29 U.S.C. at § 1132.
ERISA § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1976).
See ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. 1 1023 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
' Prior to the adoption of ERISA, a pension plan was required to fund the interest
on past service liabilities, but was not required to fund the past service principal liabilities.
S. REP. No. 127, supra note 3, at 9-10, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4846. ERISA sections 301-303, 29 U.S.C. § 1081-1083 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), require
that employer contributions to defined benefit plans be sufficient to fund present costs
and to amortize past service costs over a maximum number of years in equal annual
installments.
" See I.R.C. § 404 (1982).
'2See S. REP. No. 127, supra note 3, at 16-19, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 4852-54.
43 ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1976).
" Loss of qualified status (i.e., qualification by the Internal Revenue Service under I.R.C.
1 401 (1978)) prevents an employer from taking a federal income tax deduction for his contributions to the pension plan, unless they are already vested in the accounts of individual
participants. I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (1982). S. REP. No. 383, supra note 3, at 24-25, reprintedin
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4909-10; see also (ERISA)-QualifiedPlans-Deductions,
Contributions and Funding, TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 313, at A-5 (1976).
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investments in order to reduce the risk of substantial losses of assets,
unless it is clearly prudent not to do so."' The assets of the plan must
46
never inure to the benefit of any employer.
Employee benefit plans are covered by the Labor and Treasury Department provisions of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. 1 On August
10, 1978, President Jimmy Carter sent to Congress a reorganization plan
designed to simplify and improve the unnecessarily complex administrative
requirements of ERISA.48 The message that accompanied this plan
stressed the need to reduce duplication in administration of ERISA,
especially the overlapping authority of the Departments of Treasury and
Labor to issue regulations and decisions.49 One change reserves for the
Labor Department statutory authority to oversee fiduciary conduct.w
FIDUCIARIES' OBLIGATIONS TO PLAN BENEFICIARIES
AND PARTICIPANTS

With respect to the fiduciary obligations owed to plan participants and
beneficiaries, ERISA differs in important ways from the 1958 Act.5 It
contains a new section that sets forth responsibilities and proscriptions
applicable to persons occupying a fiduciary relationship to employee
benefit plans, including a "prudent man" standard for evaluating the conduct of all fiduciaries." It also bars from responsible fiduciary positions
for five years after conviction or end of imprisonment, whichever is later,
all persons convicted of certain crimes.' Clearly, the effort was to rectify
the deficiencies in the 1958 Act.'
The class of persons called "fiduciaries" is responsible for the establishment and administration of employee benefit plans.55 ERISA defines the
term "fiduciary" broadly; even though a person has not been officially
designated as a plan fiduciary, he may be one because of his conduct
relative to the plan. ERISA defines a fiduciary as a person who performs
any of three functions: first, exercising any discretionary authority or
" ERISA S 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. S 1104(a)(1)(C) (1976).
,' ERISA S 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. S 1103(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
" See, e.g., ERISA SS3002-3003, 29 U.S.C. S§1202-1203 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); I.R.C.
S 4975 (1982).
8 See Message of the President, Aug. 10, 1978, reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp.
V 1981). See also Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 332 (1979), reprintedin 29 U.S.C.
1001 (Supp. IV 1980), and in 92 Stat. 3790 (1978).
" Message of the President, note 48 supra.
" Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 332, 333 (1979), reprintedin 29 U.S.C. S 1001 (Supp.
IV 1980), and in 92 Stat. 3790, 3791 (1978).
, See generally sources cited note 11 supra.
See also ERISA 5 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. S 1104(a)(1)(B) (1976) (prudent man standard
of care required for ERISA fiduciaries). See generally sources cited note 11 supra.
ERISA S 411, 29 U.S.C. S 1111 (1976).
" See H.R. REP. No. 533 supra note 2, at 11, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs at 4649.
ERISA S§ 402-404, 29 U.S.C. S 1102-1104 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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discretionary control in the management of a plan or exercising any authority or control in the management or disposition of its assets; second,
rendering investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of a plan, or holding
any authority or responsibility to do so; and third, holding any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of
a plan." Thus, depending on the discretion and authority exercised or
whether investment advice is given, the following persons may be considered fiduciaries: the employing corporation, its board of directors,
trustees, investment consultants, actuaries, attorneys," investment
managers, insurance salesmen, and the named fiduciaries of a plan." The
fiduciary status of "named fiduciaries" 9 is self-evident and, consequently, so is their exposure to liability for failure to meet those fiduciary
responsibilities. Other fiduciaries have varying responsibilities and exposure to liability."
The fiduciary responsibility section of ERISA codifies and applies to
fiduciaries of benefit plans certain principles developed in the law of
trusts. 1 The legislative history of ERISA indicates that the section is
necessary for the following reasons: first, a number of plans are structured in such a way that it is unclear whether the traditional law of trusts
is applicable;"2 second, reliance on conventional trust law is insufficient
to protect adequately the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries;'
and third, even when the law of trusts applies, a participant is not
equipped to safeguard either his own rights or the plan's assets" unless
he has detailed information about the plan, access to the courts, and standards by which he can measure the fiduciaries' conduct. A fiduciary must

- ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. 5 1002(21)(A) (1976).
Attorneys, accountants, actuaries, and consultants will ordinarily not be considered
fiduciaries absent specific actions to the contrary. Question D-4, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 (1981).
This is so because they typically lack the discretionary power and authority to make plan
policy and render no investment advice with respect to any plan money or other property.
The performance of administrative functions within a framework of policies and procedures
made by others does not make a person a fiduciary. Examples of such ministerial tasks
include the calculation of benefits, preparation of employee communications, maintenance
of employment records, preparation of reports, collection of contributions, and processing
of claims. See Question D-2, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1981).
1 Little & Thrailkill, FiduciariesUnder ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 4-5, 8 (1977).
" ERISA section 402, 29 U.S.C. 5 1102 (1976), requires that every employee benefit plan
shall provide for one or more "named fiduciaries" who jointly or severally control and
manage the operation of the plan. The named fiduciaries may appoint others to perform
fiduciary responsibilities. ERISA § 405(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1) (1976).
' See, e.g., Question FR-16, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1981).
",See H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 2, at 13, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 4651.
" Id. at 12, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4650.
6 Id.
u Id.
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conform to the documents and instruments governing the plan to the extent they are consistent with the regulatory provisions of ERISA6
There are-two major standards used to guide and restrict the actions
of a fiduciary-the exclusive benefit rule and the "prudent man" standard. ERISA section 404(a)(1)" states the exclusive benefit rule as follows:
"[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to [an employee
benefit plan] solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries
and -(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants
and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan ... ." One commentator has gone so far as to predict
that the Department of Labor would take the position that section 404(a)(1)
of ERISA is a "statutory embodiment of the common law duty of loyalty,"'
while others seem to believe that the best construction of the exclusive
benefit rule in section 404 is found in the regulatory treatment given to
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code." ERISA's exclusive benefit
rule becomes even stronger when read in conjunction with its "prudent
man" rule. Section 404(a)(1)(B)"9 of ERISA specifies that a fiduciary must
act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims." There has been disagreement about whether
the statutory language of section 404(a)(1)(B) creates a "[s]uper-prudent
man rule" that places an additional burden upon a fiduciary to exercise
the same skill and care that an expert in the area of pensions would
exercise." Although this issue was the subject of considerable congressional debate in 1970 over an Administration bill on employee benefit
legislation,71 the question still has not been answered clearly. 2
S 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. S 1104(a)(1)(D) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
29 U.S.C. S 1104(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Lamon, ProfessionalMoney Managers:FiduciaryResponsibility Under ERISA, 11 REAL

65 ERISA

PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 519, 528-29 (1976).

" Little & Thrailkill, supranote 58, at 11-12 (Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code,
which provides for establishment of a trust operated exclusively for the benefit of the
participant, was coupled with section 503 of the Code, which prohibits certain transactions
between a plan and the executor of the trust or person who created the trust, to form
a general exclusive benefit rule).
'9 29 U.S.C. 5 1104(a)(1)(B) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
,0 See Sanchez, Cain, Wood, The Pension Reform Act of 1974: FiduciaryResponsibility
and Prohibited Transactions, 6 TAX ADVISOR 86, 91 (1975). The authors assert that the
ERISA prudent man rule is stricter than the common law prudent man rule governing
trustees who administer trusts. Id. at 91-92 & n.72. The common law duty is to "exercise
such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exerise in dealing with his own
property." Id. at 91 & n.72 (quoting 2 A.W. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 5 174 (3d. Ed. 1967)).
" See Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation:Hearings on H.R. 1045, H.R. 1046,
and H.R. 16462 Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Educationand Labor,
91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1970); Klevan, FiduciaryResponsibility Under ERISA's Prudent
Man Rule, 44 J. TAX'N 152 (1976).
' The House Report, while not providing an answer, provides a starting point for con-

sidering the question by stating: "It is expected that courts will interpret the prudent
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These primary statutory guides to fiduciary behavior do not expressly
address the question of whether fiduciary plan administrators such as
A, B, and C should engage the counsel of M-corp to represent the plai
in the litigation described in the hypothetical problem.7' Clearly, a fiduciary
should not make a decision which would inure to the benefit of himself
or allow plan assets to inure to the benefit of the employer.74 The
simultaneous representation of M-corp and the plan by M-corp's counsel
would not directly allow plan assets to benefit the employer or the
fiduciary plan administrators. The structure of ERISA presents a slight
paradox in that the exclusive benefit rule requires that fiduciary decisions be made solely for the benefit of plan participants and plan
beneficiaries, but the statute simultaneously allows a dual role for the
employer with respect to administration of the plan. The employer or
its employees can be the plan sponsor and plan administrators.7" A
fiduciary under ERISA who is charged with observing the standards that
76
ERISA imposes may also be a full-time employee of the plan sponsor.
Thus, Congress envisioned no inherent conflict of interest between the
employer and the plan participants and beneficiaries. Nonetheless, the
individual plan administrator whose salary derives ultimately from M-corp
may have an inherent personal conflict when M-corp is accused of fraud
and millions of dollars in damages are sought; however, ERISA makes
clear in the exclusive benefit rule what loyalty should guide the administrator's behavior. The regulations leave no doubt that the fiduciary
duty is paramount in that a fiduciary may be required to resign his posiman rule and other fiduciary standards bearing in mind the special nature and purposes
of employee benefit plans intended to be effectuated by the Act." H.R. REP. No. 533, supra
note 2, at 12, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4650.
" For the hypothetical problem analyzed in this article, see text accompanying notes
25-27 supra.
" See ERISA §§ 402-405, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102-1105 (1976).
See notes 31-34 & accompanying text supra. The regulations include the following:
Q: May an employee benefit plan covering employees of a corporation
designate the corporation as the "named fiduciary" for purposes of section
402(a)(1) of the Act?
A: Yes, it may. Section 402(a)(2) of the Act states that a "named fiduciary"
is a fiduciary either named in the plan instrument or designated according
to a procedure set forth in the plan instrument. A fiduciary is a "person"
falling within the definition of fiduciary set forth in section 3(21)(A) of the
Act. A "person" may be a corporation under the definition of person contained
in section 3(9) of the Act.
Question FR-3, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 (1981).
11Under ERISA section 406, 29 U.S.C. S 1106 (1976), a plan fiduciary is prohibited from
directly or indirectly engaging in specified transactions with a party in interest, particularly
the exchange of assets or consideration. A party in interest as to an employee benefit
plan includes "an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan." Id. at S
3(14)(C), 29 U.S.C. at § 1002(14)(C). However, section 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. 5 1108(c)(3) (1976),
provides: "Nothing in Section 406 shall be construed to prohibit any fiduciary from ...
serving as a fiduciary in addition to being an officer, employee, agent or other representative of a party in interest." Thus, a person performing fiduciary duties under a benefit
plan can receive full-time pay from his employer whose employees are covered by the plan.
See ERISA § 408(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(2) (1976).
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tion and even initiate litigation7 7against his co-fiduciaries when their decisions are contrary to ERISA.
Engaging M-corp's counsel is not contrary to any express provision of
ERISA. 78 Assuming that a choice must be made, that choice must be
guided by the exclusive benefit rule and by the "prudent man" rule. The
prudence of engaging M-Corp's counsel depends on the circumstances and
whether the typical administrator with similar skills, diligence, care, and
prudence would reach the same conclusion. Putting aside questions of competence, it could be thought prudent to engage attorneys who have
knowledge of M-div and who have participated in decisions with respect
to the specific employee benefit plan. Concurrently, assuming a prior administrative rejection of P's claims by A, B, C, the plan administrators
might plausibly reason that engaging M-corp's counsel in that situation
would be a cost-efficient way of pursuing the litigation inasmuch as the
defenses of M-corp and the plan might be identical or at least complementary. This financial saving would be consistent with that part of the exclusive benefit rule which obligates the fiduciary to discharge his duties
for, inter alia, the purpose of "defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan."79 On the other hand, if, during the administrative
process, the denial of P's claim for vested benefits was based in large
part on advice from attorneys working for M-corp, then prudence and
the exclusive benefit rule might require a fiduciary to insist upon independent legal evaluation of P's claim once the allegations of fraud and
malfeasance surface. 80
" Question FR-10,29 C.F.R. S 2509.75-5 (1981). When a majority of trustees appear ready
to take action which would violate ERISA, it becomes incumbent upon minority trustees
to take reasonable and adequate measures to prevent the transaction. Id. These steps could
include seeking an injunction, publication of the vote on the issue, or notification of the
Department of Labor. Id. Mere resignation by any of the minority trustees without any
action to prevent the imprudent conduct of the majority is not enough to avoid liability
for the majority's action. Id. A trustee may be liable for the actions of other trustees under
ERISA S 405, 29 U.S.C. S 1105 (1976) (fiduciary may be liable for breach of fiduciary responsibilities of another fiduciary if he knowingly participates in act or omission of another
fiduciary that constitutes breach).
8 Counsel to a private pension plan is a party in interest. ERISA S 314)A), 29 U.S.C.
S 1002(14)(A) (1976). A party in interest is prohibited under section 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106
(1976), from engaging in specific transactions with a fiduciary. However, the prohibitions
of section 406 do not apply to transactions such as the making of reasonable arrangements
with a party in interest for legal or other services necessary for the establishment or operation of the plan. ERISA S 408(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. S 1108(b)(2) (1976).
" See ERISA S 404(a)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. S 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1976).
' While it may appear that attorneys employed by M-corp should be prohibited from
advising the plan administrators regarding the merits of F's administrative claim for benefits
because of the attorneys' seeming loyalty and bias toward the financial interest of their
employer, such a result is not required. In the administrative context "[w]hen an attorney
advises a fiduciary about a matter dealing with the administration of an employees' benefit
plan, the attorney's client is not the fiduciary personally but, rather, the trust's beneficiaries"
under ERISA. Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Star Co.,
543 F. Supp. 906, 909 (D.D.C. 1982). Inasmuch as P is a beneficiary, the attorneys for Mcorp would be required to fairly assess the merits of P's claim for benefits.
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Even assuming that M-corp's counsel had nothing to do with the administrative response to P's claims, the fiduciary duty might require resort
to independent counsel. Should the plan attorneys, who are also counsel
for the employer, meet the fiduciary criteria and thus be subjected to
the loyalty constraints in the exclusive benefit rule,8' a serious conflict
of interest would arise when the employer is sued by a plan participant
and beneficiary. M-corp's inside counsel-and outside counsel, depending
on the nature and extent of advice previously given concerning the plan might qualify as fiduciaries. The attorney's status as a fiduciary may
8
preclude him from defending the employer. Section 406(b)(2) of ERISA
provides that a fiduciary shall not, with regard to a plan, act in his individual or other capacity on behalf of a party whose interests are adverse
to those of the plan or its participants or beneficiaries. The purpose of
this provision is to prevent "a fiduciary from being put in a position where
he has dual loyalties, and, therefore, he cannot act exclusively for the
benefit of a plan's participants and beneficiaries."' A possible resolution
of the problem may be found in section 408(c)(3),' which provides that
a fiduciary is not prohibited from serving as an officer, employee, agent,
or representative of a party in interest while also serving as a fiduciary.
This exception certainly does not grant freedom to engage in prohibited
transactions." Section 408(c)(3) prevents unequivocally prohibited transactions under section 406 from being invalidated simply because they are
self-dealing by making it possible to justify the transactions by
demonstrating their fairness and reasonableness.86 This exception,
therefore, appears to be for the narrow purpose of allowing employees
of the owner to serve as fiduciaries and as such would have a minimal
impact on the prohibitions of section 406 of ERISA. Where a fiduciary
provides legal service, it is expected that such arrangements will allow
for termination upon reasonably short notice if the arrangement becomes
"disadvantageous. '"88
89
Sections 406 and 408 of ERISA were considered in Currenv. Freitag,
a case involving a collectively bargained union pension fund established
by a trust agreement which required sixteen trustees, eight appointed
by the employees and eight from the employer associations in accord with
See text accompanying notes 66 & 67 supra; see also note 57 supra.
29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2) (1976).
H. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 249, 309, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5089.
29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1976).
Marshall v. Snyder, 572 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1978), affg 430 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D. N.Y.
1977).
"See H. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 83, at 312, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 5092.
1 Id. The term "disadvantageous" is not defined but could encompass situations of serious
conflict.
" 432 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
"
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29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B).
The plaintiffs, trustees appointed by the
employers, brought suit alleging defects in the structure and operation
of the fund and sought to hold the trustees representing the union personally liable under ERISA fiduciary provisions." The defendants
counterclaimed against the employer trustees collectively and against the
plaintiff trustee, Curren, individually for violating ERISA section 406(b)(2)
by actively representing certain contractors who refused to make required
contributions under the plan.92 The counterclaim asserted that Curren advised two employers to resist audits ordered by the fund and to refuse
payment demands because, in his opinion, the audits were properly
authorized by the fund trustees. Curren responded that he had given
his opinion, but that such opinion was as director of labor relations of
an employers association and that his activities in that capacity did not
violate his fiduciary duties to the fund. 4 The court found that Curren's
actions were in a general way adverse to the interests of the beneficiaries
of the fund because increased collection costs would result from his admonition to employers to refuse payments. 5 Though aid and comfort to
an adverse party, those acts, said the court, did not constitute a violation
of section 406(b)(c), 29 U.S.C. S 1106(b)(2)." Citing section 408 of ERISA
as the controlling authority, the court noted that because section 408 allowed Curren to act in both capacities, it would be illogical to require
him to cease rendering advice to the employers, especially in light of the
provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act which required
employees and employers to be equally represented in administering this
fund. 7 The court held that to give the section the reading urged by the
" Id. at 670.
91 Id.
92
'3
"
's

Id.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 673.

'Id.

Id. at 672. The court admits that there may be some inherent conflict between the
ERISA fiduciary duty and prohibited transactions provisions and the provisions of the
Labor Management Relations Act requiring equal representation by labor and management in the control of employee trust funds. Id. at 671. But compare NLRB v. Amax Coal
Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981), where the tension generated by equal employee-employer representation in the joint administration of pension trust funds was explored and resolved. The
court emphasized that "[a]lthough S 408(c)(3) of ERISA permits a trustee of an employee
benefit fund to serve as an agent or representative of the union or employer, that provision in no way limits the duty of such a person to follow the law's fiduciary standards
while he is performing his responsibilities as trustee." Id. at 333 n.16. After examining
the legislative history of section 302(c)(5)(B) of the LMRA which requires an equal balance
between employer and union appointed trustees, the court found no congressional intent
to allow an employer to direct or supervise the decision of a trustee it has appointed nor
any congressional intent to permit a trustee to administer the fund in the interest of the
party appointing him. Id. at 329-31. "In sum," said the Court, "the duty of the managementappointed trustee of an employee benefit fund under S 302(c)(5) is directly antithetical to
that of an agent of the appointing party." Id. at 331-32 (footnote omitted).
'T
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counterclaimers would require a fiduciary who also serves as an employee
of a party in interest not to inform or advise his employer of his opinion
regarding the propriety of actions taken by the fund." The court emphasized that the critical distinction between proper behavior and impermissible "dealing" was between "advocating a course of action or a solution and having the power to take that course or implement that
solution."" This interpretation would prohibit a fiduciary who is serving
dual roles from holding a position that authorizes him to accept, on behalf
of the plan, a compromise settlement of less than the amount properly
due the plan, but would not prohibit the fiduciary from advising his
employer that the plan might accept such a reduced amount. ' °
In the hypothetical problem involving M-corp, the interest of the
beneficiaries would be to pursue vigorously the question of the legality
of M-corp's retaining certain funds, while the interest of defendant M-corp
and its attorneys would be to vigorously contest P's claims and to preserve
M-corp's financial position. Thus, the decision by the plan administrators
to have the plan represented by the attorneys of M-corp could violate
section 406, which proscribes fiduciary actions on behalf of a party with
interests adverse to those of the participants and beneficiaries. If any
M-corp attorney is deemed a fiduciary of the plan, the probability of
violating section 406 of ERISA increases because of the possibility of settlement discussions. Under the logic of Curren,the section 406 and section 404 duty of an attorney fiduciary to operate solely for the benefit
of the plan beneficiaries and the plan participants would prohibit the attorney, if he is a fiduciary in a position that authorizes him to accept
a settlement, from accepting a compromise settlement of less than the
amount due the plan.' This position during settlement negotiations would
be inconsistent with that attorney's corresponding duty to M-corp to limit
the financial cost of settlement.
ERISA must be read in light of its overall purpose. Congress enacted
ERISA as a comprehensive remedial statute and liberal construction is
,8432 F. Supp. at 672.
9Id.

Id. The applicability of the Curren interpretation to M-corp's situation is diluted
somewhat by the court's emphasis on the fact that the trust fund in Curren was required
to have equal labor and management representation on its board of trustees. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
101 Curren recommended specific legal counsel to the employers and held meetings concerning their defense in his office. 432 F. Supp. at 671. Had he been directing the legal
action himself as an attorney his dual involvement may have been more closely scrutinized
and criticized by the court. See Note, supra note 1, at 145 (concluding after analysis of
Curren, that the "safest, most practical course for the attorney is the utilization of a separate
employment arrangement with the pension plan, or at least the inclusion of some provision
in the plan for retention of separate counsel in the event a conflict like that in Curren
should arise. From a purely pragmatic approach, any litigation between a plan and its sponsoring employer would require the application of normal professional standards regarding
conflict of interest, and as such the plan would require separate legal representation.").
10
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warranted to effect the statute's remedial purposes."2 ERISA is designed
to safeguard the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries as part
of the effort to maintain successful industrial relations, employment stability, and the flow of interstate commerce." 3 Thus, ERISA imposes extremely strict standards of conduct on individuals and organizations occupying positions of trust with respect to employee benefit plans."4 The
legislative history is replete with indications of congressional concern that
adequate protection for the interest of plan beneficiaries and participants
beyond that available under conventional trust law be guaranteed.'' In
light of this legislative intent, the judgments of all persons whose loyalty
to beneficiaries and participants is reasonably questionable should be excluded from any critical decisions. M-corp's counsel would have a duty
toward M-corp and could not represent solely the interests of the plan
beneficiaries and participants. Accordingly, the plan administrators ought
to seek independent legal evaluation of their position and independent
representation for the plan in the litigation hypothesized in the M-corp
problem.""
Should independent counsel, after investigation and analysis, agree with
the judgment of M-corp's counsel concerning the merit of P's case, the
0I Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (D.N.J. 1980); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271, 275-76 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Marshall v. Snyder,
430 F. Supp. 1224, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1978). See Marshall
v. Craft, 463 F. Supp. 493, 496 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
103 ERISA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
,0, ERISA SS 404, 406-409, 29 U.S.C. SS 1104, 1106-1109 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
10sSee, e.g., S. REP. No. 127, supra note 3, at 28-29, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 4864-65; H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 2, at 11-12, reprintedin [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4649-51. See generally 120 CONG. REC. 29,194 (1974) (remarks
of Rep. Biaggi); 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 120 CONG. REC.
29,951 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen); 120 CONG. REc. 29,962 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Beall).
" Counsel would have a conflict of interest not only if they represented both the plan
and M-corp, but also if they represented both the plan and the plan administrators accused
of fraud and malfeasance. See notes 153-72 & accompanying text infra. Because of the conflict between the administrators' interests and the plan's interests when there are allegations
of fraud against the individual plan administrators, they should not select the independent
legal counsel for the plan. Several alternative methods are available. Untainted and unaccused co-fiduciaries, either corporate or individual, could be delegated that responsibility
by the accused plan administrators or by the court. Alternatively, the plan administrators
could select counsel subject to the approval of the court. Finally, the court could appoint
independent counsel. While ERISA does not explicitly provide for the appointment of a
receiver or substitute fiduciary, ERISA section 409(a), 29 U.S.C. S 1109(a) (1976), does make
a breaching fiduciary "subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may
deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary." This section has been construed
to give the court power to appoint a receiver in an attempt to stabilize funds of employee
benefit plans during the pendency of an ERISA action against officials of those plans. Marshall v. Snyder, 572 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1978), affg 430 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
See also Selig v. Morrison, 230 Ark. 216, 321 S.W.2d 769 (1959) (when trustee had personal
interest in ligitation involving trust estate antagonistic to that of beneficiaries, court affirmed appointment of a trustee ad litem to conduct litigation); A.W. ScoTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS S 199.4 (3d ed. 1967) (court may suspend powers of a fiduciary and designate
another to perform those duties).
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question arises whether ERISA and its fiduciary guidelines would permit the plan administrators to engage M-corp's counsel for litigation. The
motivation for considering such a move would be the possibility of reducing litigation expense. The possibility that some discovery may be needed
before independent counsel could form an adequate opinion, particularly
when there are allegations of fraud, may vitiate any anticipated financial
saving; however, assuming that a real opportunity to save money exists,
the possibility of future settlement discussions would seem to foreclose
engaging M-corp's counsel even after receiving an evaluation from independent counsel. 10 7 M-corp's counsel would have concerns about the interest
of M-corp that could unavoidably affect their advice about settlement proposals in ways that would not be consistent with the exclusive interests
of plan beneficiaries and participants. Such conflict should not be risked
when the purposes of ERISA are at stake. This conclusion is strengthened by the analysis of the professional code of conduct for attorneys.
PROFESSIONAL ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated by the
American Bar Association 18 governs the ethical conduct of attorneys. The
Code has been criticized for its failure to deal adequately with the problems of corporate counsel."0 9 Few of the provisions address directly the
problems related to corporate counsel and those that do are often vague
and confusing. 110 Corporate lawyers struggle to apply rules designed for
an advocate of an individual client to their role as counselors of a corporation. Nevertheless the Code provides some guidance for the resolu107 Cf. UAW v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 447 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 147-53 infra).
...MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY (1981). Every state and the District of
Columbia has adopted this code or some variation of it as the basic standard of legal ethics.
M. PIRSIG & K. KIRWIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (3d ed. 1976). The code consists of
three separate but interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and

Disciplinary Rules ....

The Canons are ... axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers ....
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational ... and represent the objectives
toward which every [attorney] should strive. They [provide guidance] in many
specific situations ....

The Disciplinary Rules ... are mandatory in character.

[They state] the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall

without being subject to disciplinary action.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1981)

(footnotes omitted).
" See, e.g., Frank, A Higher Duty: A New Look at the Ethics of the Corporate Lawyer,
26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 337 (1977); Pierce, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility in the Corporate World: An Abdication of ProfessionalSelf Regulation, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 350 (1973).
I See generally Burke, The Duty of Confidentiality and Disclosing CorporateMisconduct,
36 Bus. LAW. 239, 253-82 (1981).
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tion of the problem of representation of both the plan and M-corp by
M-corp's attorneys.
Under Canon 5 of the Code, a lawyer's judgment must be exercised
solely for the benefit of his client and be free from compromising
influences."' Impermissible conflicts appear whenever an attorney is likely
to prefer outcomes contrary to the client's wishes or interests -for example, when the client's interests conflict with the financial well-being
of the attorney or some third party"' represented by the attorney."' With
respect to the hypothetical problem, M-corp's outside and inside counsel
have personal financial interests in maintaining relations with M-corp;
consequently, M-corp's counsel may tend to favor the wishes of M-corp
over the interests of the plan. Ethical Consideration 5-14 precludes acceptance or continuation of conflicting employment when it dilutes loyalty
and independent judgment."" Ethical Consideration 5-15 directs the attorney to weigh carefully the possibility of conflicting interests of multiple clients. 5 Under Ethical Consideration 5-21, a lawyer subject to third
party influence should consult his client and possibly withdraw.'
Ethical Consideration 5-15 specifies in emphatic terms that a lawyer
"should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests," and that it is preferable that clients with potentially differing
interests not be represented by the same attorney.117 " 'Differing interests'
include every interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or
the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest.""' 8
The Code, by itself, does not require that the attorney terminate his
relationship with the client at the first hint of conflict. Routes for ending
various conflicts without destroying the attorney-client relationship
abound."9 However, the rules appear to prefer withdrawal from represen..The canon states: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment
on Behalf of a Client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1981). See
id. EC 5-1: "The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised ... solely for the
benefit of his client" and should not be affected by the lawyer's "personal interests, the
interest of other clients, nor the desires of third persons."
' Id. EC 5-2 (attorney should avoid employment if personal interests of attorney contrary to those of client).
I

Id. EC 5-14.

Id.
Id. EC 5-15.
Id. EC 5-21.
17 Id. EC 5-15.
. Id. Definition 1.
See id. DR 5-104(a) (lawyer may enter into business transaction with client only upon
full disclosure of potential conflict and with client's consent); id. DR 5-107(A) (attorney shall
not accept compensation from nonclient without client's consent); id. EC 5-2 (attorney can
avoid circumstances that might interfere with representation of his client); id. EC 5-3
(avoidance of acquisition of property rights that might adversely affect professional judgment); id. EC 7-9 (attorney may ask client for permission to forego action the attorney
deems unjust even if in client's best interest); id. EC 7-17 (attorney under no obligation
to conform personal opinion to that favorable to client).
114

REPRESENTATION OF ERISA PLANS

1982]

tation because of conflict or the appearance of conflict.120 When independent judgment is impaired by multiple representation, the attorney's
obligation to withdraw is clear from Disciplinary Rule 5-105:
DR 5-105
(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of
his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will
be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the
proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him
in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted
under DR 5-105(C).
A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exerciseof his independentprofessionaljudgment in behalf of a client will
be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of
another client, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under
DR 5-105(C).
In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw
from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partneror associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may
accept or continue such employment. 2'

In the M-corp hypothetical the extent of conflict between the plan and
M-corp depends on the nature of P's allegations. However, given ERISA's
fiduciary duties, several inherent points of diversity are apparent." First,
the plan administrators are bound by ERISA to discharge their duties
12See id DR 5-101 (an attorney must refuse employment if interest impairs judgment);
id. EC 5-15 (attorney would have to withdraw from employment if the interests of his multiple
clients became actually differing); id. Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety").
Id. DR 5-105 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
22

Under the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1981) any litiga-

tion between a plan and its sponsoring employer would require that the plan engage separate
legal representation. See Note, supranote 1, at 145. P's lawsuit, a class action, is analogous
to a shareholder's derivative action brought on behalf of the shareholders for the benefit
of the corporation. P's suit is brought on behalf of the plan participants and beneficiaries,
whose interests are identical with those of the plan because the plan must be administered
exclusively for their benefit. In a real sense then, P's lawsuit, because of its class nature,
is a suit for the plan against the plan sponsors. Thus, the principle of the Canons would
seem to require the same result as in a derivative suit, namely, the engagement of separate
legal counsel. See Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 216 n.10 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), modified, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976) (although ABA ethical considerations provide that under some circumstances multiple representation may be permissible if both
clients are fully informed and consent, the consent rationale is particularly inapplicable
to a shareholder's derivative suit since the corporation must consent through the directors, who themselves are the defendants).
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solely for the beneficiaries and plan participants; accordingly, they would
be required under ERISA to have the plan counsel evaluate the merits
of P's claims, not from a defensive position in the first instance, but with
a view toward determining whether M-corp has fraudulently withheld
funds rightfully due plan beneficiaries and participants. M-corp's counsel,
representing the plan, would be obligated under the Code as M-corp's
counsel to defend against P's attempt to have M-corp disgorge millions
of dollars. M-corp's counsel would explore and assert every reasonable
defense."' This would be especially true when M-corp's counsel has had
a long relationship with M-corp as outside counsel. Independent counsel
for the plan would be obligated to ensure that plan assets are not used
to benefit the employer and would objectively scrutinize M-corp's retention of funds with a view toward recouping all monies unlawfully withheld.
Even assuming complementary defenses between the plan and M-corp,
the conflicts and differing interests of the plan and M-corp could become
acute during any settlement discussions because M-corp would have financial concerns differing from those of the plan, which must always operate
solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries and participants."4
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) indicates that conflicting interests in the context of multiple representation are not always fatal to the attorney-client
relationship: an attorney may represent multiple clients with potentially
conflicting interests if it is "obvious" that he would be able to exercise
independent professional judgment for each after full disclosure and client
consent.125 Disciplinary Rule 5-105(0) and Ethical Consideration 5-15, read
together, indicate that situations in which multiple representation is acceptable include nonlitigation circumstances in which the attorney has
fully disclosed to both clients the extent of the conflict and received their
consent. However, that mechanism of sanctifying multiple representation
may not be available here because ERISA unequivocably demands action
by the plan administrators exclusively and solely for the benefit of plan
beneficiaries and participants. 2 ' ERISA, properly construed, would seem
to prohibit the plan administrators from consenting to such multiple
representation since even a scintilla of doubt about the independent judgment of counsel should be resolved in favor of engaging truly independent counsel. Such doubt would exist in the M-corp case because of allegations of fraud by M-corp as well as by the plan administrators, and because
Canon

'
124

See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

1

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1981).

See generally text accompanying notes 89-102 supra.

7 (1981).

In Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp., 456 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Ohio 1978), the court decided
that trustees may be held liable for failing to act for the exclusive benefit of participants
and beneficiaries in the administration of a benefit plan. Cf. Feagan v. Lang, 416 F. Supp.
53 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (trustees, motivated by fear that failure to enforce employer's obligation
could subject trustees to personal liability for breach of their fiduciary duties, sued to
recover $6.52 in delinquent contributions from employee who was subject to union plan).
"
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of counsel's responsibilities to, and financial interest in, the corporate
defendant. The ERISA exclusive benefit rule"n and the purpose of ERISA
seem to require this view. Thus the Code's cure for conflicts - disclosure
and consent by the client when it is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent the interest of each-would be unavailable in the
hypothetical. The primacy of the implied dictates of ERISA over the Code
is reinforced because ERISA is a federal statute which preempts any conflicting state law."n Codes of professional conduct are adopted by the states
and therefore preempted by ERISA to the extent there is conflict.
On January 30, 1980, the American Bar Association released its Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to remedy some
of the shortcomings of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility."
The Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct was released
on May 30, 1981."w The rule pertinent to the propriety of multiple representation is rule 1.7 in the Final Draft.1 3 ' Rule 1.7 states that a lawyer's other
responsibilities will not be a bar to representation when, first, the implications, advantages, and risks of common representation are disclosed;
second, the client consents; and third, the attorney believes the conflicting interest will not adversely affect the best interests of the client.' 2
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1976).
See note 6 supra. Admittedly, the ERISA-mandated prohibition against multiple
representation by counsel of the plan and plan sponsor when there are allegations of fraud
and malfeasance is an inference rather than an express statutory provision. It could, however,
become express law in that it has been held that "Congress has invested the courts with
a duty to create law governing aspects of employee benefit plans not specifically regulated
by ERISA." Wayne Chem. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D.
Ind. 1977), modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977). The court found support in the remarks
of Senator Javits, speaking on behalf of the conference committee's version of ERISA.
The Senator stated: "In view of Federal preemption, State laws ... will be superseded.
It is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts
to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."
Id. at 321-22 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).
...See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preface to Draft (Discussion Draft 1980).
The Model Rules have provoked widespread criticism and discussion. The Association of
Trial Lawyers of America and the National Organization of Bar Counsel have proposed
revisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility in response to the Model Rules. Burke,
Third Competitor Enters New Ethics Code Debate, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 29, 1980, at 2. See also
Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015 (1981).
1' MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Final Draft 1981), reprinted in 67 A.B.A.J.
(Supp. 1981). If approved by the American Bar Association House of Delegates, the Final
Draft of the Model Rules will replace the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as
the primary statement of the ethical standard of the profession. Voting by the House of
Delegates is scheduled for February 1983. See Graneili, ABA Defers Ethics Code Vote, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 23, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
131 The MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (Final Draft 1981) contains
the general rule on conflict of interest: "A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT A CLIENT
IF THE LAWYER'S ABILITY TO CONSIDER, RECOMMEND OR CARRY OUT A
COURSE OF ACTION ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENT WILL BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES TO ANOTHER CLIENT OR TO A
THIRD PERSON, OR BY THE LAWYER'S OWN INTERESTS."
132 Id.
1
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The Notes accompanying rule 1.7 point out that the rule consolidates
several provisions of the current Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. 13 One difference is that, while DR 5-105(C) requires that
it be "obvious" that the attorney can provide "adequate" representation,
the representation must reasonably appear compatible with the best interest of the client. The test in rule 1.7 is objective: "when a disinterested
lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask
for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's
consent."' 1
The comment following rule 1.7 attempts to define conflict. It can "exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that
there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims
or liabilities in question." 135 The latter factor is relevant to the M-corp
problem because the plan fiduciaries are bound to represent all the
beneficiaries and participants and are limited in the extent to which they
could compromise the rights of such persons." 8
Common representation of persons having similar interests is proper
under the comment to rule 1.7 if the risk of adverse effect is minimal.
Arguably, under ERISA M-corp or a plan sponsor ought to have the interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries at the top of its priorities.
However, the propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the
nature of the litigation. For instance, "a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation."1 Fraud, under the terminology of the Final
Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive, not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure
to apprise another of relevant information." The instant situation contains allegations of fraud; however, the nature of the litigation and the
gravity of the conflicts raised will determine the propriety of simultaneous
representation- at least in cases in which ERISA is not involved.1 39 The
set of circumstances in which concurrent representation is allowable under
ERISA, if at all, must be extremely narrow in light of the strict duty

11 Id. at notes (comparing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
DR 5-105(A), DR 5-105(0), DR 5-107(B) (1981)).

RESPONSIBILITY

DR 5-101(A),

1- Id. at comment.
135

Id.

See Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp., 456 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (fiduciaries may
not lawfully discriminate among similarly situated classes of participants; there is a duty
to act solely in interest of all participants).
'
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (Final Draft 1981).
's MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (Final Draft 1981).
"

139See id.
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of ERISA fiduciaries.'40 Illustrative of this goal is the classic formulation
by Judge Cardozo of the standard of fiduciary conduct:
Many forms of conduct permissible to a workaday world for those
actions at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."'
The attorney can be disciplined for a violation of the disciplinary rules
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Discipline is not,
however, under the exclusive control of bar associations."' The district
court has the clear duty, as well as power, to disqualify counsel for improperly representing adverse interests."' For the purpose of preserving the integrity of the court and the bar, the court in disqualification
cases should apply the precepts for ethical, professional conduct as set
forth in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,"' and should not
permit "[a] lawyer ... to put himself in a position where, even unconsciously he will be tempted to 'soft pedal' his zeal in furthering the interests
of one client in order to avoid an obvious clash with those of another
"145

Surprisingly few cases address the issue of disqualification from joint

"I See generally Gallagher, Recent Developments in Concepts Relating to FiduciaryLiability,
16 FORUM 753 (1981).
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, J.).
Cerameo, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1975); Wayne Chem.
v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ind. 1977), modified, 567 F.2d
692 (7th Cir. 1977).
"I Circuit courts have repeatedly upheld district court orders disqualifying counsel for
conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); Emle
Indus., v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973). In cases in which the lower court
denied disqualification, appellate courts have also remanded the issue of apparent impropriety
and attorney disqualification for the district court to reconsider in light of its plain duty
to disqualify counsel if their conduct is or appears to he improper. See, e.g., Kramer v.
Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); American
Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1975); J.P. Foley Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d
1357 (2d Cir. 1975); Tomlinson v. Florida Iron & Metal, 291 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961). Accordingly, the district court has the clear duty, as well as power, to disqualify counsel for
improperly representing adverse interests. Even in cases involving only potentially adverse
interests or the possibility of divided loyalty, courts have emphasized that all doubts should
be resolved against the propriety of representation. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1978) (court stated that "[dloubts as to the existence
of an asserted conflict of interest should be resolved in favor of disqualification").
1" In a footnote, the court in Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurant, Inc., 590 F.2d 168,
172 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979), commented that "[a]s the profession's own expression of its ethical
standards, the Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules provide substantial guidance to federal courts in evaluating the conduct of attorneys
appearing before them." Accord Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
,"I Estate Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 345 F. Supp. 93, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(Weinfeld, J.).
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representation in an ERISA case. The only case' to meet the issue headon is InternationalUnion, UAW v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., in which the court
in a brief opinion denied the motion to disqualify. 41 7 In Allis-Chalmers the
plaintiff alleged that a joint venture agreement between Allis-Chalmers
and another corporation violated ERISA. 4' The defendants included AllisChalmers, the corporate sponsor of the plan, and Harris Trust and Savings Bank, a fiduciary trustee of the benefit plan.' The court, in denying
plaintiffs motion for dismissal, based its holding on two factors. First,
the court stated that an attorney would not be disqualified on plaintiffs
motion where a record leaves "no reason to believe that the purposes
of ERISA will not be served by such representation."'" Thus, Allis-Chalmers
reinforces the approach and conclusions reached earlier."' The court examined the question of disqualification of an attorney engaged in multiple representation under ERISA in light of ERISA's purposes. The brief
analysis, unfortunately, does not reveal directly the reason the court found
no intrusion on ERISA's purposes; it does contain its conclusion and implicit affirmation that fidelity to the purposes of ERISA was a factor.
Second, the court underscored the bank's consent to the concurrent
representation, but only after a trust officer of the bank reviewed the situation with the bank's legal department and determined that, despite the
dual representation, employer's counsel would be able to exercise independent professional judgment."' Thus, the bank in Allis-Chalmers obtained
a legal evaluation independent of the employer prior to consenting to multiple representation. In the M-corp problem A, B, and C, plan administrators
and fiduciaries, received their legal guidance from M-corp's counsel who,
unlike the bank's legal department, cannot reasonably be expected to give
independent professional judgment because they derive their income
ultimately from M-corp and have professional obligations to M-corp as
well. Acceptance of M-corp's counsel by A, B, and C is imprudent and
sufficient grounds for disqualification of M-corp's counsel under AllisChalmers.A, B, and C would have to engage independent outside counsel
to act in a manner consistent with Allis-Chalmers.
Other cases brought under analogous statutes support such a requirement of independent legal counsel. Although not directly on point, Yablon"' The same counsel have appeared for employer-sponsored benefit plans and the
employers in other suits under ERISA involving allegations of breach of fiduciary duty.
The suits, however, do not address the issue of attorney disqualifications. See, e.g., Bonin
v. American Airlines, 621 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1980); American Communications Ass'n, Local
10 v. Retirement Plan for Employees of RCA Corp. & Subsidiary Cos., 488 F. Supp. 479
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
.. 447 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
148Id. at 767.
19 Id. at 768.
Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
"' See text accompanying notes 77-79, 102-07 & 127-28 supra.
'
147 F. Supp. at 771.
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ski v. United Mine Workers'5 ' illustrates the lengths to which courts have
gone to disqualify inside counsel when disqualification is predicated upon
significant infringement of a specific legislative policy in addition to rules
of professional ethics."5 In Yablonski a dissident union group brought an
action against the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) union and
union officers seeking an accounting of union funds and seeking restitution of funds allegedly misappropriated. After withdrawal by a private
law firm because of a mandate issued by the court of appeals upon finding a potential conflict of interest,'5 the general counsel of the union sought
to represent both the union and union officers in the action, and the dissident union group filed a motion to disqualify the general counsel.1 56 The
lower court denied the motion and the appellants petitioned the court
of appeals for further relief pursuant to the earlier mandate. Much of
the appellees' argument was devoted to attempted justification of the
UMW's representation by its inside counsel on the ground that its institutional interests as a union coincided with the individual defensive
interests of the officers who were sued. As the court aptly stated, this
approach "puts the cart before the horse." ' The court quoted the lower
court's reasoning: "'In trying to achieve a valid definition of an institution's interest, it would seem that counsel charged with this responsibility
should be as independent as possible.'

"'5'

The court further observed:

"[R]epresentation of a labor union by counsel free of possibly conflicting
obligations to adverse parties is directly related to attainment of the goals
Congress envisioned when it passed the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959."'' 11 The court concluded:
454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
,u The court noted that "[tlhe cases have reached apparently conflicting conclusions where
the disqualification was sought upon ethical considerations alone." Id. at 1038 n.9. See, e.g.,
Uniweld Prods., Inc., v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.2d 992, 994 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 921 (1968).
11 A private law firm withdrew after the court of appeals issued a mandate in Yablonski
v. UMW, 448 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1971), to vacate an earlier district court denial of a motion
to disqualify the firm. 454 F.2d at 1037.
l1 454 F.2d at 1037.
' Id. at 1041.
" Id. (quoting Yablonski v. UMW, 448 F.2d 1175, 1181 (D.D.C. 1971)). In its earlier Yablonski
decision an outside law firm retained by the UMW could not continue as dual counsel because
the court found in the firm's past and ongoing representation of the UMW's president
in other litigation the potential for conflict with obligations owing the UMW. Id. at 1177-80.
The critical nature of the public interest inherent in the purpose of the statute in question
was evident from the court's conclusion:
[T]he objectives of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act would
be much better served by having an unquestionably independent new counsel
in this particular case. The public interest requires that the validity of appellants' charges against the UMWA management of breach of its fiduciary
responsibilities be determined in a context which is as free as possible from
the appearance of any potential for conflict of interest in the representation
of the union itself.
Id. at 1179-80 (emphasis added).
"1 454 F.2d at 1039.
15
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In sum, a sine qua non of permissible union representation in a Section 501 action is the absence of any duty to another that might detract
from a full measure of loyalty to the welfare of the union. House
counsel no less than outside counsel must survive that test. In this
instance, house counsel plainly do not. 16
More on point is the case of InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters
v. Hoffa.6 ' The Hoffa court stated emphatically that when union officials
are charged with a breach of fiduciary duty, the union (which acts for
the union membership just as the plan administrators must act for its
participants and beneficiaries) is entitled to an evaluation and representation of its interest by independent counsel unencumbered by potentially conflicting obligations of counsel in the employ of a defendant officer."
In Hoffa individual union members, suing on behalf of the union membership, charged the union officers and trustees with breaches of their
fiduciary duty.'63 In particular the complaint in Hoffia charged that the
officers made unauthorized disbursements in violation of fiduciary obligations imposed upon them by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 and sought injunctive relief and an accounting.'"
Hoffa is similar to the M-corp problem, in which P has brought suit on
behalf of similarly situated participants and beneficiaries of the M-div
employee benefit plan. P has charged defendants, M-corp, and the plan
administrators with fraudulent breaches of fiduciary duty, including the
improper conversion of plan assets (for example, premium refunds). P also
seeks injunctive relief and an accounting.
In Hoffa the union moved to be a party defendant." 5 The court was
receptive to that motion, leaving it open to renewal by subsequent independent counsel, but rejected the simultaneous representation of the
union and union officers by identical counsel because of the conflict of
interest. 66 The court stated: "Where, as here, union officials are charged
with breach of fiduciary duty, the organizationis entitled to an evaluation
and representation of its institutional interests by independent counsel,
unencumbered by potentially conflicting obligations to any defendant
officer."' 7
The Hoffa court cited with approval' the case of Milone v. English,69
in which union officials were charged with fraud. The Milone court stated:
16 Id. at 1042.
...
242 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1965).
162Id. at 256.
16 Id. at 247.
6 Id. at 247-48.
165Id. at 251.
16 Id. at 257.
1 Id. at 256 (emphasis added); accord,Murphy v. Washington American League Baseball
Club, 324 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
16 Id. at 255-56.
169306 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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the charges have substance a sound resolution may be prevented
by the very fact of dual representation during the process leading
to a decision with respect to the charges. Different counsel would be
required in this process. In other words, counsel who are chosen by
and represent officers charged with the misconduct, and who also
represent the union, are not able to guide the litigation in the best
interest of the union because of the conflict in counsel's loyalties. In
such a situation it would be incumbent upon counsel not to represent
both the union and the officers. 170

To the union's contention that the similarity of the defenses offered
by the organization and the individual defendants eliminated possible conflicts of interest, the court in Hoffa responded: "Potential, no less than
actual, conflict disqualifies counsel from serving in a double capacity, and
the potentiality of conflict is clearly present here."'" The court elaborated:
Counsel representing an individual defendant must not only bend every
effort to demonstrate that he did not violate his fiduciary obligations
but must also assert any and all legitimate claims that, notwithstanding any violation adjudged, the organization is barred from attaching
responsibility to him. But if ... breach of duty be found, counsel
representing the International [union] will be equally bound to seek
restoration of the funds expended. In that event the interests of the
International and the officer would become seriously adverse, and the
responsibilities of counsel irreconcilably conflicting, and, however forthright and objective counsel serving both may endeavor to be, the duality of the role would be untenable."'
The same situation is presented in the M-corp problem. Should defendant M-corp, for example, be adjudged liable for converting millions of
dollars, defendant benefit plan and its counsel would be obligated to seek
restoration of those funds for the benefit of the plan participants and
beneficiaries.
CONCLUSION

An examination of the statutory scheme and legislative history of
ERISA reveals a deep concern on the part of lawmakers for public interest. A historical record of pension plan abuse and ineffective legislation was observed, and an attempt was made, through ERISA, to correct
it by providing dependable employee benefit plans for millions of American
workers.
The structure of ERISA does not contemplate a necessarily adversarial
relationship between the employer and the employee benefit plan administrators. On the contrary, it contemplates the possibility of a dual
7oId. at 817. It follows from this logic that the same counsel could not simultaneously
represent the plan and the plan administrators who have been accused by P of fraud and
malfeasance.
242 F. Supp. at 256.
Id. at 256-57.
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role for the employer and specifies, for example, that a plan administrator
fiduciary can also be a paid employee of his employer. To prevent the
overlapping responsibilities from being abused, and to ensure that the
promise of ERISA will not be vitiated, the statute relies heavily on a
strict standard of fiduciary conduct and penalizes breach. Thus, ERISA
fiduciaries must act solely for the benefit of the plan participants and
beneficiaries and in a prudent manner, even if they are employed by the
same employer. Moreover, an attorney retained by the plan administrators
must perform his duties in a manner consistent with the administrators'
obligations to the plan.
When a plan participant sues the plan and his employer, the plan administrators are obligated to select counsel to represent the plan. For
reasons of efficiency, the plan administrators may justifiably consider
engaging the employer's inside and outside counsel, particularly when
that counsel has intimate knowledge of the employee benefit plan. An
attorney representing both the employer and the plan can maintain that
role only if the interest of the plan and the employer are identical. When
there are allegations of fraud against the employer, as in the hypothetical
problem involving M-corp, conflict arises between the interest of the
employer in defending against a claim for monetary damages, and the
interest of the plan in aggressively pursuing the possibility that the
employer owes money to the plan participants and beneficiaries. Even
if there is little merit in the participant's claims, potential for conflict
exists between the plan and the employer when the possibility of settlement discussions is considered. Consequently, the fiduciary duties set forth
in ERISA require that the plan administrators retain independent outside counsel who are untainted by adverse interests, personal or strategic.
The standards of conduct for attorneys offer further support for a requirement of independent counsel for the plan. Both the current and the
proposed rules of professional conduct contain prohibitions against an attorney's representing multiple clients who have adverse or differing interests that might impair the independent judgment the attorney owes
each client. Each code contains an exception permitting multiple client
representation after disclosure by the attorney and consent by the clients.
For several reasons the exception is unavailable in a situation under
ERISA involving litigation when there are allegations of fraud. The degree
of conflict is greater when there are allegations of fraud."' In that situation it would be difficult for counsel to conclude, as the current rules re1 4
quire, that it is "obvious""
that he can adequately represent both clients.
Such a conclusion becomes even more problematic when the ERISA duty
of fidelity to the plan participants and beneficiaries is superimposed on
the attorney's general duty to represent each client zealously. The result
of dual representation when there are allegations of fraud is some infringement upon the statutory policy of exclusive loyalty to the plan. The
cases examined suggest that sound resolution of the charges may be
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prevented by the very fact of dual representation; they further show that
even if the canons of professional ethics raise only a rebuttable presumption against multiple representation, the disclosure and fiduciary policies
embodied in a statute such as ERISA render the presumption irrebuttable when fraud is alleged.
The correct inference from the language of ERISA is that when there
are allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, the allegations should
be evaluated for the plan by independent counsel. Plan administrators
should not extend, nor should attorneys accept, offers to represent multiple clients in this situation. If a court were presented with a case in which
an attorney was representing multiple clients when fraud and breach of
fiduciary duties were alleged, the court would, under ERISA, be obliged
to disqualify the attorney.
'" See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7, comment (Final Draft 1981).
...MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

companying note 121 supra.

DR 5-105(C) (1981), reprintedin text ac-

